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ABSTRACT: The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of
argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete normative theory of argumentation
should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-mindedness are
worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based
argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that
can account for why argumentative virtues are worthwhile.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If we derive a theory of argumentation from virtue ethics along the lines of Cohen
(2007), then such a theory inherits what Rachels & Rachels (2010) have called the
incompleteness problem from virtue ethics. Virtue ethics, and hence a virtue-based
theory of argumentation, is not a complete theory for two reasons. First, a virtuebased theory of argumentation does not provide us with a mechanism for resolving
conflicts of argumentative virtues that does not refer to extra-virtue theoretic
considerations (Rachels & Rachels, 2010). For example, open-mindedness to other
views may conflict with tenacity of one’s own position. Second, a virtue-based
theory of argumentation does not provide us with a reason for why it is good to be a
virtuous arguer that does not appeal to considerations outside of virtue ethics such
as pragmatic-utilitarian concerns (Rachels & Rachels, 2010).
The first problem may not be as serious as it appears given that many
conflicts of virtues are really not conflicts of virtue at all, since in many
argumentative contexts, one of the so-called virtues is, along Aristotelian lines,
taken to a vicious extreme. For example, if one is too open-minded, then it would be
difficult to remain tenacious with respect to one’s own view. Or if one is too
tenacious, then there is little openness to alternative points of view. Cohen (2007)
mentions that a “sense of proportion” is required to maintain a proper balance
between the virtues, which is certainly consistent with an Aristotelian concept of
virtue as a mean between two extremes:
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And yet, tenacity, cleverness, and passionate engagement are all argumentative
virtues right alongside open-mindedness and attentiveness. Perhaps what is really
needed is a sense of proportion, as something of a meta-virtue, to keep them all in
balance. (Cohen, 2007, p. 8)

However, as will be shown, there are many kinds of cases where a balance between
virtues is already present, and yet there is still a conflict where no resolution is
forthcoming without appeal to another stance such as a pragmatic-utilitarian point
of view or an appeal to dialectical obligations (Johnson & Blair, 1987).
Even if a virtue-based theory of argumentation is incomplete in this first
sense, perhaps it at least provides us with a motive for why one should be a virtuous
arguer. However, this is not the case. There is no component of virtue ethics that
involves the claim that one should be virtuous, as being virtuous is not itself a virtue
on pain of circularity. Granted, Aristotle attempted to link being virtuous with
pleasure, so that a motive for being virtuous is that it will give rise to the right kinds
of pleasures. But an appeal to pleasure is strictly speaking a hedonisticconsequentialist approach. Or, one might adopt the stance that being a virtuous
arguer is conducive to gaining insight into the nature of the world, and that the
pursuit of knowledge is itself a virtue. However, the question that arises is why
should we pursue knowledge. To avoid an infinite regress of virtues, we are forced
to appeal to a pragmatic reason such as we fare better in life if we have knowledge,
or perhaps to a deontological reason such as one ought to pursue knowledge.
The overall thesis that will be defended in this paper is that although a
virtue-based theory of argumentation is worthwhile, it is not able to stand alone in
either of the two senses mentioned above. A virtue-based theory of argumentation
that is adumbrated with a pragmatic-utilitarian component will be developed that is
able to overcome the incompleteness problem. Although an appeal to dialectical
obligations is another promising approach, in the final analysis, it does not work
given that it falls prey to the incompleteness problem with a deontological approach
to ethics given that conflicts of duties are not resolvable without appeal to an
external theory.
2. APPARENT CONFLICTS OF ARGUMENTATIVE VIRTUES THAT ARE NOT REALLY
CONFLICTS
As alluded to above, there will be alleged clashes of virtues in argumentative
contexts that are not really clashes owing to one of or more of the virtues being
taken to a vicious extreme. In this type of situation, there is not a conflict of virtues,
but rather a conflict of a virtue with a vice or a conflict between several vices. Such
cases do not illustrate an aspect of the incompleteness problem for a virtue-based
theory of argumentation. An example of such a clash will help drive this point home.
Suppose two evolutionary biologists are deeply divided on the issue of
whether evolution is a result of mutation, natural selection, migration, and genetic
drift (traditional theory) or whether evolution is explainable simply in terms of
genetic drift (the “neutral” theory). The one scientist, call her Deborah, is deeply
committed to the natural selection view of evolution, arguing for this view with
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great tenacity, to the point where the other scientist, Ibrahim, regards Deborah as
being somewhat dogmatic. Cohen (2007) lists tenacity as an argumentative virtue
that presumably results in the cognitive achievement of “entitlement to one’s
position” (Cohen, 2007, p. 6) Further, suppose the scientist, Deborah, defending this
traditional view of evolution values keeping an open mind, even though her openmindedness is being hampered by her extreme tenacity..
On the surface, there appears to be a clash with respect to Deborah between
two argumentative virtues, viz., tenacity and open-mindedness. However, Deborah
has taken her tenacity to such an extreme that it hampers her ability to keep an
open mind, which in turn diminishes the cognitive achievement of “a deepened
appreciation of the opponent’s position” (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Further, Deborah’s
dogmatism will preclude her from cognitively achieving the ability to abandon her
standpoint for a potentially better one (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Taken in proper
proportions, what is normally an argumentative virtue, viz., tenacity, has become an
argumentative vice if we accept an Aristotelian characterization of virtue as being a
mean between two vicious extremes.
The above example illustrates that apparent clashes between two
argumentative virtues are on deeper analysis sometimes a clash between a virtue
and a vice, or a clash between two vices. A virtue-based theory of argumentation is
able to resolve such a conflict by labelling at least one of the alleged virtues a vice.
3. REAL CONFLICTS OF ARGUMENTATIVE VIRTUES THAT REQUIRE EXTRA-VIRTUE
THEORETIC RESOLUTIONS
However, situations can arise that involve a genuine clash between two virtues, as
will be illustrated in the following example. In this type of situation, a virtue-based
account of argumentation does not provide a mechanism for resolving the clash
without appealing to an external theory such as a pragmatic-utilitarian or a
dialectical obligation approach to argumentation.
Expanding on the example developed above, suppose that Ibrahim like
Deborah values both tenacity with respect to one’s position along with keeping an
open mind. Ibrahim is committed to the neutral theory of evolution on the grounds
that it can offer new insights into the evolution of sexual reproduction in eukaryotic
organisms, which remains somewhat of a mystery in the context of a more
traditional account of evolution. However, because he also values being openminded, he does not carry his tenacity to a vicious extreme. He is willing to concede
to Deborah’s arguments for the traditional view, provided that they are cogent and
closer to the truth than the neutral theory. He is even willing to completely abandon
his own account of evolution if it does not stand up to the traditional account of
evolution, but not to the point of simply abandoning his position without putting up
a serious defence of his own views.
Ibrahim finds himself in a quandary. He feels an entitlement to his own
position given increasing evidence in the scientific literature supporting the neutral
theory, and yet at the same time, he values keeping an open mind and deferring to
solid arguments that may refute his position. His tenacity with respect to his own
position clashes with his desire to keep an open mind, which could situate him in a
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kind of stalemate since there is no mechanism in virtue ethics that classifies one
virtue as being more important than another virtue. If Ibrahim does attempt to
resolve his stalemate by placing greater weight on one virtue over the other, his
reasons for doing so will appeal to considerations outside of virtue ethics.
For example, Ibrahim may decide that it is more important to keep an open
mind than to be tenacious on the grounds that this is more likely to lead to scientific
progress. But this is a pragmatic-utilitarian consideration. Or, he may decide that it
is more important to stick to one’s guns and defend a given position for the purpose
of seeing what it may lead to and what its beneficial effects might be on scientific
progress. Then once again, he is deferring to pragmatic-utilitarian reasons for
placing greater weight on tenacity. Or, he may feel that it is his duty, his dialectical
obligation, to defend the neutral theory with respect to other researchers working
in that field. In that case, he is appealing to a kind of deontological reason for placing
more weight on tenacity.
It could be argued that as soon as Ibrahim decides to place more weight on
one virtue rather than another, he is carrying that virtue to its vicious extreme.
Then, Ibrahim’s case reduces to Deborah’s case where there is now a clash between
an argumentative virtue and an argumentative vice, so that there is no problem for a
virtue-based account of argumentation after all. Nonetheless, the initial clash for
Ibrahim was a clash between two of his argumentative virtues neither of which he
had carried to a vicious extreme. Further, in deciding to place more weight on
tenacity rather than open-mindedness, there is no reason why he needs to become
tenacious to a vicious extreme such that it entirely precludes his open-mindedness.
Presumably, there is a range along the continuum between two vices where a state
of character still counts as a virtue even if it deviates slightly from the exact mean.
What is noteworthy here is that Ibrahim’s resolution was achieved by appealing to
considerations outside of virtue ethics.
4. SPHERES OF EXPERIENCE, COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS, AND WHY WE SHOULD
BE VIRTUOUS ARGUERS
Although a virtue-based theory of argumentation requires external points of view to
resolve conflicts of argumentative virtues, perhaps it at least provides us with a
motivation for why we should be virtuous arguers. However, as will be argued, even
the motivation for being a virtuous arguer depends on considerations external to
virtue ethics.
Taking her lead from Aristotle, Martha Nussbaum attempted to ground moral
virtues in so-called spheres of experience that relate to any human life (Nussbaum,
1988). For example, the virtue of courage is grounded in the universal experience of
fear of death (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 497). The virtue of moderation is grounded in the
universal sphere of experience relating to bodily appetites and pleasures, justice in
the sphere of experience relating to distribution of limited resources, and so forth
(Nussbaum, 1988, p. 497). Given that moral virtues are grounded in spheres of
experience relating to the human condition, then there is a clear answer to the
question of why we should be virtuous: We should be morally virtuous, because
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virtues are grounded in universal spheres of experience relating to the human
condition.
Perhaps a similar tact can be taken with respect to grounding argumentative
virtues. Cohen (2007) outlines a number of so-called cognitive achievements that
can be obtained from virtuous argumentation, such as a better appreciation and
understanding of one’s own position, an appreciation of other points of view, an
improvement of one’s own position, entitlement to one’s own position, and so forth
(Cohen, 2007). Cohen then defines an argumentative virtue as “acquired habits of
mind that are conducive to one of argumentation’s characteristic cognitive
achievements” (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Thus, open-mindedness is an argumentative
virtue grounded in the cognitive achievement of more deeply appreciating other
points of view. On the other hand, tenacity is an argumentative virtue grounded in
the cognitive achievement of entitlement to one’s own position. The grounding of
argumentative virtues in cognitive achievements seems to pave the way for an
understanding of why we should be virtuous arguers: We should be virtuous
arguers because this is conducive to achieving important cognitive ends that are
universal and regarded as important by all human beings.
However, there is an important difference between spheres of experience
and cognitive achievements. The former are arguably universal, and they emerge
from the human condition, whereas the latter are not necessarily universal nor
regarded as important by all human beings. Different individuals may well have
opposing views as to what the cognitive achievements of argumentation are, or
what they should be. It certainly makes more sense to ask “why should I strive for a
deepened appreciation of another’s position?” than to ask, “why should I be afraid of
death?” Further, the various cognitive achievements mentioned in Cohen, 2007 may
come into conflict with one another, which brings us full circle to the charge that a
virtue-based theory of argumentation cannot resolve conflicts of virtue. A deeper
appreciation of another’s position may compromise one’s sense of entitlement to
one’s own position, and so the virtue of open-mindedness grounded in the former
may come into conflict with the virtue of tenacity grounded in the latter.
If argumentative virtues cannot be grounded in cognitive achievements,
perhaps we need to revisit the Aristotelian spheres of experience. As outlined by
Nussbaum, 1988, an additional sphere of experience is “intellectual life” (Nussbaum,
1988, p. 497). Thus the intellectual virtues, including argumentative virtues, could
be grounded in the sphere of intellectual life. Therefore, we should be virtuous
arguers because it is conducive to the intellectual life. However, not everyone
pursues or even desires the intellectual life, whereas everyone fears death and is
concerned with bodily appetites. Someone who does not strive for the intellectual
life will not be persuaded to be a virtuous arguer simply because it is conducive to
the life of the mind.
So there appears to be no good reason, within a virtue-based theory of
argumentation, for why we should be virtuous arguers. As with the case of resolving
conflicts of virtues, there is cause to look outside of virtue ethics for moral
motivation. It is not hard to find a justification for why we should be virtuous
arguers outside of virtue ethics. For example, we should be virtuous arguers
because it is our moral and dialectical obligation to do so. Johnson and Blair (1987)
5
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argue that persons engaged in argumentation have certain dialectical obligations
such as putting forward premises that are adequate, as well as premises that are
relevant to the conclusion and which jointly provide sufficient support for the
conclusion (Johnson & Blair, 1987, pp. 48 - 55). We could extend Johnson and Blair’s
concept of dialectical obligations to include keeping an open mind, being tenacious,
being attentive to the other’s position, and so forth. Why should one be openminded, tenacious, attentive, etc. as arguers? Well, because all of these are our
dialectical obligations. However, just as a virtue-based theory of argumentation
inherits the incompleteness problem from virtue ethics, a deontology-based theory
of argumentation inherits the problem that there is no obvious way to resolve
conflicts of duties without appealing to an external theory. Our duty to be openminded may sometimes conflict with our duty to be tenacious. As Rachels & Rachels,
2010 point out, the inability to resolve conflicts of duties is a sore spot for any
deontologically based theory of ethics (Rachels & Rachels, 2010, pp. 129 – 135). And
so, we are back to the drawing board with respect to trying to find a grounding for
argumentative virtues.
A much more promising external theory to ground argumentative virtues is a
pragmatic-utilitarian approach: We should be virtuous arguers because overall,
virtuous arguers fare better in life in terms of achieving their ends and the ends of
their community than non-virtuous arguers. Whether or not this is really true can
only be established empirically, although it is a promising lead. A virtue-based
theory of argumentation adumbrated by a pragmatic-utilitarian approach will be
sketched in the next section.
5. A VIRTUE-PRAGMATIC-UTILITARIAN-BASED THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION
A virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian-based theory of argumentation espouses
argumentative virtues based on pragmatic-utilitarian grounds. Such an approach
provides a motive for being a virtuous arguer, provided that it can be shown
empirically that virtuous arguers generally fare better in terms of achieving their
goals than non-virtuous arguers, and that a community of virtuous arguers is
somehow better off (happier overall, achieves more of its goals) than a community
of non-virtuous arguers. On this approach, an argumentative virtue can be defined
as a moderate (between two extremes) state of character conducive to realizing
cognitive ends that are beneficial for the arguer and the community of which they
are a member. Further, a virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian-based approach to
argumentation can be applied to resolving conflicts of virtues in argumentative
contexts. One virtue may be more pragmatic to pursue than a conflicting virtue
depending on what the arguer’s goals and preferences are, and depending on what
the goals and preferences are of their community (scientific, philosophical, society
at large). Thus, any such resolution to a conflict of virtues will be sensitive to the
goals and preferences of the arguer as well as to overall utilitarian considerations
such as what is best for the community of which one is a member. For example, if
one is trying to secure a research grant that could advance knowledge, tenacity may
pay off better than open-mindedness. Or, in that situation, it may turn out that being
open-minded pays off better than tenacity. To see in more detail how the
6
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adumbrated theory works in this regard, let us reconsider the example of Ibrahim
and Deborah, the biologists on opposite sides of the fence regarding the theory of
evolution.
In the example outlined above, Ibrahim is in a quandary given that he equally
values the virtues of tenacity and open-mindedness, nor does he carry either to a
vicious extreme. Suppose Ibrahim finds out that his research proposal for NSERC
defending the neutral theory of evolution has a good chance of being short-listed
since there is increased interest in the scientific community regarding the neutral
theory. Then it may be in his best interest to pursue tenacity with respect to his own
theory and to focus less on being open-minded with respect to defences of
traditional evolutionary theory. If Ibrahim’s project is funded, he can employ
graduate students to help out with the research along with bringing prestige to his
institution, and it may advance significantly the field of evolutionary theory. As
noted above, it could be argued that Ibrahim is deciding to carry tenacity to a vicious
excess like Deborah, and open-mindedness to a vicious deficiency also like Deborah,
and so the resolution to his conflict is achieved at the cost of no longer being a
virtuous arguer. However, deciding to be tenacious with regards to one’s own
theory does not entail that that one must carry tenacity to a vicious excess nor that
one must carry open-mindedness to a vicious deficiency. Ibrahim, even though he
defends his theory more seriously may still be willing to abandon his position in the
face of serious counter-evidence if he has reason to believe that developing this
theory may harm scientific advancement. In such a case, even though he is pursuing
tenacity with respect to his theory, he is not carrying it to a vicious extreme, and he
is also remaining open-minded.
The theory of argumentation developed in this section provides a possibility
for resolving conflicts of virtue with respect to the same arguer. However, can the
theory resolve conflicts of virtue between arguers? Suppose that both Deborah and
Ibrahim are virtuous arguers, but Deborah chooses to pursue open-mindedness and
Ibrahim decides to pursue tenacity but not to the point of vicious extremes in either
case. A virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian approach to argumentation could at least in
principle resolve the conflict by determining which is most beneficial to their
community’s goals and to their own goals – Ibrahim’s pursuing tenacity or
Deborah’s pursuing open-mindedness.
6. CONCLUSION
A workable virtue-based approach to argumentation is not a stand-alone theory
since it cannot resolve conflicts of virtues nor does it provide a motive for being a
virtuous arguer. However, if we add to a virtue-based theory a pragmatic-utilitarian
decision-procedure for determining which virtues to employ in a given
argumentative context keeping in mind the goals and purposes of the arguers, the
problem of incompleteness is solved.
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